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FOLLOWING IN ANOTHER'S FOOTSTEPS: THE 
ACQUISITION OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
STANDING BY THE PALESTINE LIBERATION 
ORGANIZATION 
" ... a State is created by a nation's struggle for existence. " 
Theodor Herzl 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is a public body 
which has been accorded certain international legal standing. The 
purpose of this Comment is to chronicle the acquisition of that 
standing by reference to identifiable stages in a similar process un-
dertaken by the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency for Palestine. 
This kind of analysis should illustrate not only how internation~l 
law bears upon Middle Eastern developments, but also how interna-
tional practice of the last half century has allowed peoples such as 
the Jews and Palestinians to attain legal standing, as a vehicle for 
acquiring territorial sovereignty. 
International law has been described as a "process by which the 
peoples of the world clarify and implement their common interests 
in the shaping and sharing of values. " 1 The acquisition of interna-
tional legal standing is a part of that process and a means toward 
that end. It is, however, a fairly amorphous concept underlying such 
better-defined practices as diplomatic recognition or the declaration 
of an entity's rights by the United Nations. In part, legal standing 
allows an entity to be the subject of these practices, but in part it 
is also a product of them. It is not the purpose of this Comment to 
examine all of the factors which contribute to legal standing, nor 
even to catalogue those which are strictly legal in nature. Rather, 
this article will seek to identify and assess the stages through which 
a non-territorial, non-sovereign group is likely to pass on the way 
toward attaining legal standing and territorial sovereignty. 
The subjects of international law-those national and juridical 
persons on whom the law confers rights and imposes duties2-have 
1. McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative 
Decision, 19 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 275 (1967) [hereinafter cited as McDougal]. A corollary of 
this rule seems to be that "an instrumental goal of a public order of human dignity is of course 
the equipping of all individuals for full participation in authoritative decision." Id. at 256. 
2. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, The Subjects of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW: COL-
LECTED PAPERS 148 (E. Lauterpacht ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as COLLECTED PAPERS]. 
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traditionally and exclusively been states.3 Individuals and groups 
have enjoyed substantive rights recognized at international law, but 
such rights have been granted only by municipal law "in accordance 
with a duty imposed upon the State concerned by International 
Law."4 States, in other words, have traditionally been the benefici-
aries of international rights and have served as trustees of those 
rights for their inhabitants. It follows that a principal distinction 
between states and individuals at international law has been, and 
continues to be, that states have a full procedural capacity while a 
like capacity in individuals is available only by express or tacit 
agreement of states. 5 
Since at least the early years of this century, however, there has 
been a trend in substantive international law toward "broader par-
ticipation."6 As a result, individuals and groups are now considered 
3. McDougal, supra note 1, at 262. States have been the traditional subjects of interna-
tional law in part because only they were able to offer "solid guarantees for the fulfilment of 
obligations .... " W. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 197 (8th ed. A.P. Higgers 
1924) [hereinafter cited as HALL]. This ability to fulfill obligations is particularly important 
in international law where no independent regime exists to enforce such obligations. 
Another view is offered by Professor Oppenheim, who suggests that: "[S]ince the Law of 
Nations is based on the common consent of individual states, states are the principal subjects 
of International Law. 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 19 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955) 
[hereinafter cited as OPPENHEIM]. 
4. OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 19. 
5. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, The Place of International Law in Jurisprudence, in COLLECTED 
PAPERS, supra note 2, at 193. Another international legal scholar, Professor M. St. Korowicz, 
states: 
[l]t is a well-established principle of international law that States may by 
common agreement create and recognize the international personality of individuals, 
not only in their substantive rights, their duties and responsibilities under interna-
tional law, but also in their capacity for international procedural action. The fact 
that the right of individuals to proceed before international bodies is very limited in 
the practice of international law today [1959], does not exclude the creation or 
enlargement of this right at any moment by an agreement between States. 
M. KOROWICZ, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 385 (1959) [hereinafter cited as 
KOROWICZ]. 
6. McDougal, supra note 1, at 262. In his memorandum, Survey of International Law in 
Relation to the Work of Codification of the International Law Commission, A/CN. 4/1/Rev.1, 
at 19 (Feb. 10, 1949), the Secretary General of the United Nations said, "Practice has aban-
doned the doctrine that states are the exclusive subjects of international rights and duties." 
Also in 1949, the International Court of Justice observed that: 
[T]he progressive increase in the collective activities of States has already given rise 
to instances of action upon the international plane by entities which are not States. 
Advisory Opinion on Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, 
l1949] I.C.J. 174, 178 [hereinafter cited as Reparations Case]. 
Although McDougal, supra note 1, at 262, sets 1945 as the approximate beginning of 
these developments, there is convincing evidence that they began much earlier with the 
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among the direct recipients of internationally-recognised rights. 7 
Subjects of international law are no longer "identical in their nature 
or in the extent of their rights." Rather, "their nature depends upon 
the needs of the community."8 
While this broadening of participation is a significant develop-
ment, its importance for individuals and groups is diminished by 
the fact that international law is still, essentially, state-made law. 9 
Accordingly, the subjects of international law and the rights they 
possess continue to be determined by states. 10 
Among potential subjects are persons situated in diverse coun-
tries seeking recognition as a group, and the rights to which they 
may collectively be entitled. If these persons obtain general state 
consent, they can now be accorded such international recognition 
and rights independently of their local municipal laws. Still, they 
have no procedural capacity to enforce or actualize these rights 
without, again, obtaining the consent of the community of nations. 
A quest for international legal standing, then, is the effort to gain 
that international grant of procedural rights. 
advent of the minorities treaties and the mandate system. The minorities treaties have been 
described as: 
(Ajn important factor in the process of eroding the concept of absolute State sover-
eignty in the field of human rights and a telling precedent for international concern 
with matters which had traditionally been considered as coming within the unfet-
tered discretion of each individual State. 
E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 22 (1964). It should be noted 
that while the minorities treaties granted rights to groups within states, those rights could 
only be exercised by an established state acting on behalf of the minority. OPPENHEIM, supra 
note 3, at 712, 715-16. 
7. Cf. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, General Rules of the Law of Peace, in COLLECTED PAPERS 295-
300. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948); 
and Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G .A. 
Res. 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16 at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 
8. Reparations Case,
1 
(1949] I.C.J. at 178. 
9. It has always been obvious for an overwhelming majority of jurists that under the 
present international law only states and some interstate organizations are able to 
create rules of the law of nations, and that individuals may derive their international 
rights only by means of an agreement of states endowing the individual with his own 
limited personality. 
KOROWICZ, supra note 5, at 329. See also H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS 29-30 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LAUTERPACHT, HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
10. KoROWICZ, supra note 5, at 329-30. 
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II. STEPS IN THE ACQUISITION OF INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL STANDING 
A. Speak and Act for a "People" 
The first step taken by the Zionist Organization 11 in its effort 
to bring about a Jewish state12 was to establish itself as a subject of 
international law. It did so by supporting and getting influential 
states to support the proposition that Jews were an identifiable 
"people" whose principal representative on the international plane 
was the Zionist Organization. 13 
Use of the word "people," rather than "nation," is intended to 
emphasize the prevalence of subjective elements in this particular 
process. "Nation" has an objective sense (i.e. community of race, 
language, religion or culture), 14 whereas the term "people" connotes 
11. The Zionist Organization was named by the League of Nations as the "appropriate 
Jewish agency" to cooperate with the Mandatory in development of the Jewish National 
Home in Palestine. Although a Jewish Agency was recognized by the British in 1931 as a 
replacement for the Organization, that Agency and the Zionist Organization remained closely 
linked until establishment of the State of Israel. Mallison, The Legal Problems Concerning 
the Juridical Status and Political Activities of the Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency: A 
Study in International and United States Law, 9 WM. & MARYL. REV. 556, 570-71 (1968) 
[hereinafter cited as Mallison]. See note 40 infra. 
12. There is little doubt that the Zionists, from their earliest days, sought creation of a 
sovereign Jewish state. In the Manifesto of the Bilu, members of a movement of the "Lovers 
of Zion" (early Zionists) declared: 
[W]e want: 
1. A home in our country [Palestine] . 
2. To beg it of the Sultan himself, and if it be impossible to obtain this, to beg 
that we may at least possess it as a state within a larger state .... 
THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER 4 (W. LAQUEUR ED. 1969) [hereinafter cited as THE ISRAEL-ARAB 
READER]. In a pamphlet originally published in 1896, Theordor Herzl, founder of political 
Zionism, suggested: 
Let the sovereignty be granted us over a portion of the globe large enough to satisfy 
the rightful requirements of a nation; the rest we shall manage for ourselves. 
T. HERZL, THE JEWISH STATE 92 (1946). After the first Zionist Congress had adjourned in 1897, 
Herzl wrote in his diary: 
If I were to sum up the Basie Congress in one word-which I shall not do openly-it 
would be this: at Basie I founded the Jewish State. 
I. COHEN, THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT 78 (1946) [hereinafter cited as COHEN]. 
13. See notes 21, 42 infra. Sir Herbert Samuel, first British High Commissioner in Man-
datory Palestine, testifying before the League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission 
on the issue of whether the Zionist Organization was "the authentic interpreter of Jewish 
opinion," reportedly stated that although there were individuals and groups "on the outskirts 
of Zionism," these represented "extremes of opinion," and the "main body" of Jewish opinion 
was "favourable to the Zionists." League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, 
Minutes of the 5th Session (Extraordinary), 9th Meeting, A. 13, 1924 VI, at 63-64. 
14. For an enumeration of the qualities of nationhood see J. STOYANOVSKY, THE MANDATE 
FOR PALESTINE 52 (1928) [hereinafter cited as STOYANOVSKY]; HALL, supra note 3, at 17. 
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such subjective concepts as sharing a high frequency of perspec-
tives15 or "value-oriented goals" 16 or, more specifically, having a set 
of common desires to live a distinct community life. 17 Furthermore, 
"nation" implies a degree of geographic contiguity which is not a 
necessary element for development of a group's self-consciousness 
as a "people." 
The self-consciousness of Jews as a people, in a political sense, 
arose most recently out of 19th century nationalism and the increase 
in persecution which that nationalism fostered. 111 For centuries Jews 
had maintained a "hope of restoration" to the land of their past. 
That ancient hope took on "new forms of expression" in the 19th 
century, among which was Zionism. 19 One aspect of the Zionist 
Movement, so-called "political Zionism," was motivated in part by 
the idea that anti-Semitism would not disappear, that Jews would 
never be truly assimilated in predominantly non-Jewish communi-
ties, and that the Jewish people must, therefore, be constituted as 
a nation. 21 The Zionist Organization helped develop that self-
consciousness by working for a "binding together of the whole Jewry 
15. Cf. McDougal, supra note 1, at 255. 
16. Bassiouni, "Self-Determination" and the Palestinians, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 31, 31-32 
(1971). The full quote is as follows: 
Only that group of individuals who feel commonly bound by certain factors of some 
permanency, and whose collective behavior reveals that they share certain value-
oriented goals which they are desirous of implementing [constitutes a people]. 
17. STOYANOVSKY, supra note 14, at 52. 
18. [T]he XIX century, strongly romantic, with its intense nationalism and acute 
historical sense, evoked again the yearning for Palestine and the self-consciousness 
of Jewish individuality, to which the pogroms, themselves product (sic) of Gentile 
nationalism, gave a tragic meaning and a critical impact. 
s. SALEEBY, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM 19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as SALEEBY]. 
19. R. LEARSI, ISRAEL: A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 481-82 (1949). Zionism is a 
"Jewish nationalist movement which has had as its goal the creation and support of a Jewish 
national state in Palestine . . . . " 
10 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 886 (1974). 
20. See Mallison, supra note 11, at 560. This idea was expressed in Herzl's pamphlet, 
THE JEWISH STATE, supra note 12, at 85-92. According to Ormsby-Gore, British representative 
to the League of Nations' Permanent Mandates Commission, while the original conception 
of the Jewish National Home in Palestine was as a place of refuge for Jews persecuted in 
Eastern Europe, the Zionist movement had come to mean much more. "It had united an 
enormous number of Jews in every country of the world in the interest of restoring the former 
home of the race." Statement by Mr. Ormsby-Gore on the Administration of the Mandated 
Territory of Palestine, League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 
4th Session, 11th Meeting, A.13 1924 VI, at 87-88. 
21. The official statement of Zionist purpose, adopted at the first Zionist Congress, said 
that the tactics here quoted were among the means to be used to create for the Jewish People 
a home in Palestine secured by public law. The Basle Declaration, reprinted in THE lsRAEL-
ARAB READER, supra note 12, at 11-12. See also COHEN, supra note 12, at 77. 
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by means of appropriate institutions, local and international" and 
for "(t)he strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment 
and consciousness."21 
In contrast, the self-consciousness of the Palestinians as a peo-
ple arose more from circumstance than did that of the Jews. To say 
circumstance is not to exclude deliberate outside encouragement, 22 
but the fact of such encouragement does not make a people's self-
consciousness, once attained, any the less real or potent. 
The Arabs living in Palestine were touched by the spirit of Arab 
nationalism (a concept born of some of the same 19th century philo-
sophical forces as motivated Zionism).23 Near the start of the Man-
date period, however, their sense of identity as a separate Arab 
group began to develop in response to Zionist aspirations regarding 
Palestine.24 British and League of Nations' promises of independent 
statehood coupled with periods of substantial Jewish immigration 
into Palestine during the Mandate period contributed to the nas-
cent group identity. 25 The attachment of the Palestinian Arabs to a 
22. Y. Harkabi, a lecturer at Jerusalem's Hebrew University who has written sympathet-
ically of the Palestinian role in the Middle East concedes: 
that states like the U.A.R. [United Arab Republic] and Iraq evoked the idea of 
'the Palestinian entity' in meetings of the Arab League from 1959 on, doing so for 
tactical reasons within inter-Arab rivalries, and the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion was established by a decision of the Arab rulers at their First Summit Confer-
ence. 
But he is quick to point out that: 
the call for the Palestinians to organize themselves and assume the central role 
in the struggle against Israel came also from within the ranks of the Palestinians 
themselves. 
Harkabi, The Position of the Palestinians in the Israeli-Arab Confiict and Their National 
Covenant (1968), 3 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 209 (1970). 
23. Cf. Esco FOUNDATION FOR PALESTINE, INC., 1 PALESTINE - A STUDY OF JEWISH, ARAB AND 
BRITISH POLICIES 444 (1947). 
24. Lesch, The Palestine Arab Nationalist Movement Under the Mandate, in W. 
QUANDT, F. JABBER & A. LESCH, THE POLITICS OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM, 5, 14 (1973). 
25. Id. at 16, 20-21. Arabs argue that the promise of independence for Palestine was 
contained in a letter of Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Cairo, to Hussein 
ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca. The letter, dated .October 24, 1915, did pledge independence for 
a large area of the Middle East in the vicinity of Palestine, and the Arabs understood it, 
apparently contrary to British intentions, to include Palestine. See the Hussein-McMahon 
Correspondence July 1915 - March 1916, 27 BRIT. SEss. PAPERS 573, 579, Misc. No. 3, CMD. 
No. 5957, at 7 (1939), reprinted in J. HUREWITZ, 2 DIPLOMACY IN THE NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST 
13-16 (1956) [hereinafter cited as HuREWITz]. 
However, in 1919 the League of Nations placed Palestine among those mandate territo-
ries whose "existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized." LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS COVENANT art. 22; see HUREWITZ, supra at 61-62; STOYANOVSKY, supra note 14, at 36-
40. 
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common land, 26 their large-scale displacement from that land at the 
termination of the Mandate, 27 the bitter and frustrating experience 
of the refugee camps, 28 and the policies of the surrounding Arab 
states29 served to transform that group identity into an emerging 
nationalist conclusion. Among the aims of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization is "the undertaking of all means of forging conscious-
In his Statement of British Policy on Palestine of July 1, 1922, the British Secretary of 
State for the Colonies denied that the McMahon letter was a promise of independence for 
Palestine, but went on to say, "Nevertheless, it is the intention of His Majesty's Government 
to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government for Palestine." Palestine: 
Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization: British 
Policy in Palestine, 23 BRIT. SESS. PAPERS 243, 262-63, CMD. No. 1700, at 20 (1922), reprinted 
in HuREWITZ, supra at 103, 106. The promise of independence was re-introduced in a 1939 
Statement (White Paper) of British Policy on Palestine. 27 BRIT. SESs. PAPERS 597-608, CMD. 
No. 6019 (1939), reprinted in HUREWITZ, supra at 218-226. 
26. See Harkabi, supra note 22, at 213. Harkabi quotes a Palestinian, Nasir ad-Din an-
Nashashibi, as having written: 
Every year I shall say to my little son: "We shall return my son, and you will be with 
me; we shall return; we shall return to our land and walk there barefoot. We'll remove 
our shoes so that we may feel the holiness of the ground beneath us. We'll blend our 
souls with its air and earth. We'll walk till we come to the orange trees; ... we'll 
sleep in the shade of the first tree we meet; we'll pay homage to the first martyr's 
grave we come across. We'll tum here and there to trace our lives. Where are they? 
Here with this village square, with this mosque's minaret, with the beloved field, the 
desolate wall, with the remains of a tottering fence and a building whose traces have 
been erased. Here are our lives." 
NASIR AD-DIN AN-NASHASHIBI, RETURN TICKET 205 (1962). 
27. Within the 1948 cease fire lines of Israel were approximately 150,000 Arabs whereas 
formerly there had been about 800,000. W.B. Quandt, Political and Military Dimensions of 
Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism, in W. Q~ANDT, F. JABBER & A. LESCH, THE POLITICS 
OF PALESTINIAN NATIONALISM 48 (1973) [hereinafter cited as QUANDT]. 
28. Id. See Harkabi, supra note 22, at 211. 
29. Following the 1948 Arab invasion of Palestine, Egypt held and administered the Gaza 
Strip, but never claimed sovereignty over it. The courts in Gaza continued to apply Pales-
tinian law, and the territory's constitution, signed by Egyptian President Nasser in 1961, 
declared that Gaza is an inseparable part of Palestine. The International Status of Palestine, 
90 JouR. DU DROIT INT'L 984 (1963). 
During the invasion, Jordan took control of much of the "West Bank" area that was to 
go to the Arab State envisioned in the United Nations Partition Plan. Later, the Hashemite 
Kingdom attempted to annex the West Bank following elections in which Palestinian resi-
dents of the area voted. The annexation was recognized by only two countries, however, and 
denounced by the Arab League which resolved, with whatever jurisdiction it had, to treat the 
area as a "trust until the Palestine case is fully solved in the interests of its inhabitants." 
Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Refiections on the Status of Judea and Samaria- Yehuda, 3 
ISRAEL L. REV. 279, 290 (1968). Jordan lost control of the West Bank during the war with Israel 
in 1967, and has subsequently ceded her claim to it to the PLO. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1974, 
at 1, col. 8. 
The Arab defeat in the 1967 war "accelerated the development of a Palestinian national 
movement .... " QUANDT, supra note 27, at 50. 
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ness and training the Palestinian, in order to acquaint him pro-
foundly with his homeland, spiritually and materially. " 30 
The fact that individuals conceive of themselves as a people is 
no guarantee that they are collectively entitled to self-government,31 
or to any other rights available under international law. Although 
they may have a "moral claim" to such rights, 32 they may prefer 
that those rights be in some sense "legally" established. 33 In that 
case, the individuals, through a public body organized to represent 
them, must obtain "consent" to their collective identity as a people 
and to the public body's status both as their representative and as 
a subject of international law. 
B. Participate on Behalf of a People in International Affairs 
Consent, which is considered one of the principal sources of 
law, 34 is described in international terms as the "assent of the com-
munity of states."35 As a source of international law, consent mani-
fests itself in custom and treaties36-that is, in certain practices of 
states. 37 But practice, as reflecting consent, is not only a primary 
source of international legal rules, it is an indicator of relationships 
and status as well. 38 Thus, it is to the practice of states that one may 
30. THE PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COVENANT, art. 7, reprinted in Harkabi, supra note 22, at 
227, 232. 
31. STOYANOVSKY, supra note 14, at 53. 
32. They may be like inchoate states which arise in the course of a revolution and are 
permitted by sovereign states to temporarily exercise certain rights and privileges, by which 
they are said to have a "moral claim" at international law. C. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
102 (1924) [hereinafter cited as FENWICK]. 
33. The dichotomy between a "moral" claim (see note 32 supra) and a legal one at inter-
national law is not as clear as a distinction between equity and law in a municipal context. 
On the international plane, most judicial and legislative functions are operated by the same 
hand (i.e. the consent of the community of states). Nonetheless, some rudimentary inter-
national prerogatives have evolved which may be claimed as a matter of law by groups which 
have acquired a certain status. 
34. Cf. 1 H. LAUTERPACHT, The Definition and Nature of International Law and its Place 
in Jurisprudence, in COLLECTED PAPERS 32 [hereinafter cited as LAUTERPACHT, The Nature of 
International Law]. 
35. Mallison, supra note 11, at 567. According to Oppenheim, "common consent is the 
basis of all law." OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 15. 
36. OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 25. 
37. LAUTERPACHT, The Nature of International Law, supra note 34 at 51. 
38. Generally, states may acquire new territorial or other rights without formal recogni-
tion being required to affirm their validity. This is not the case with acts creating new rights 
which acts have violated existing rules of international law. The invalidity of the latter, 
however, can be wholly or partially cured by acts of other states, specifically, recognition. 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 141-42. 
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look to determine if a public body has been accepted as a subject 
of international law. 39 
International assent to the idea that Jews constituted a people 
appeared in the willingness of sovereign states to deal· with the 
entity which purported to represent that people-the Zionist Organ-
ization.40 It was principally through this practice of established 
states that the Organization itself acquired legal standing as a pub-
lic body and hence became a subject of international law. 
Prior to the Zionist Organization's founding , Theodor Herzl, 
who was active in the Zionist movement, sought political support 
for the concept of a Jewish state in Palestine from the German 
Kaiser and the Turkish Sultan. 41 Having been received by neither 
of these heads of state, Herzl is said to have concluded that the only 
way he could hope to secure practical corperation was the demo-
cratic method of calling a congress of representatives of the Jewish 
people.42 The Zionist Organization was established by such a con-
gress and Herzl, the Organization's president, and his successors 
39. Precedent exists for the standing of a public body to be determined according to the 
practice of established states. The Order of Malta, a medieval hospital organization which 
acquired territory during the Crusades, did not lose its sovereignty when it lost its territory, 
according to the Court of Cassation in Italy, because its "attributes of sovereignty and inde-
pendence," such as the right of active and passive legation and the right of negotiating 
directly with other states and entering into conventions and treaties, had not ceased. Nanni 
and Others v. Pace and The Sovereign Order of Malta, [1935-1937] Ann. Dig. 2, 5 (No. 2) 
(Court of Cassation, Italy). 
Similarly, Graham, in his study of Vatican diplomacy, concludes that the Holy See 
possesses non-territorial sovereignty on grounds that: 
[I]t can act in its own name in the international community. It can enter into legally 
binding conventions known as concordats. In the world of diplomacy, the Pope enjoys 
the rights of active and passive legation . . . . 
GRAHAM, VATICAN DIPLOMACY: A STUDY OF CHURCH AND STATE ON THE INTERNATIONAL PLANE 186, 
201-02 (1959), quoted in 1 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 591 (1963). But see 
note 4 7 infra. 
40. Theodor Herzl, who founded the Zionist Organization, had forseen the need among 
Jews for a gestor, a noble person or group of persons which, according to Roman concepts, 
was "the director of affairs not strictly his own." If the common cause were in danger, and 
the dominus-or body of citizens-were prevented either by want of will or by some other 
reason from helping itself, the gestor, without obtaining authority in a circumstantial fashion, 
would "simply take the leadership into his hands and march in the van." 
Herzl anticipated that the Jewish gestor would be his proposed Society of Jews, which, 
by his description, had many of the characteristics and functions later attributable to the 
Zionist Organization. Among other duties, the Society would seek in its external relations to 
be recognized as a "state-forming power." According to Herzl, "[t]he free assent of many 
Jews will confer on it the requisite authority in relations with governments." HERZL, supra 
note 12, at 136-41. 
41. COHEN, supra note 12, at 75. 
42. Id. 
10
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 18
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/18
230 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:221 
were subsequently able to negotiate with the Kaiser, the Sultan, 
and with the governments of Great Britain, Russia and Egypt, 
among others. 43 Talks with officials in Great Britain eventually pro-
duced the Balfour Declaration and British support for establish-
ment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. 44 
The willingness of these states to deal with representatives of 
the Zionist Organization provided high level but limited endorse-
ment of that Organization's claim to represent an identifiable, non-
sovereign people. The presence of its representatives at the Paris 
Peace Conference (1919), however, has been described as a "tenta-
tive multilateral recognition of the Zionist Organization as a public 
body."45 The Organization subsequently participated in the drafting 
of the Mandate for Palestine and was said to have enjoyed a "privi-
leged position" in those discussions because of its "political alli-
ance" with Great Britain. 46 
The substantive powers which an entity possesses and the way 
it uses them may also contribute to its public body status. 47 Pales-
tine under the Mandate, for instance, had most of the character-
istics of a state. 48 The Zionist Organization, through the Jewish 
Agency (and later the Agency alone), had duties-both imposed49 
and assumed50-relating to many of those characteristics.51 Such 
43. Id. at 80-83. 
44. Mallison, supra note 11, at 568. The negotiations, are described in some detail in 
COHEN, supra note 12, at 112-20. It should be noted that the Declaration came in the midst 
of World War I and was motivated in part by a desire to obtain Jewish sympathy for the Allied 
cause. It should also be noted that the French and Italian governments concurred in the 
position taken by the British regarding the National Home. COHEN, supra, at 119. 
45. Mallison, supra note 11, at 569. 
46. Id. 
47. Reparations Case, [1949] I.C.J. at 178-80. In that case, the International Court of 
Justice began its inquiry into whether the United Nations had the capacity to bring an 
international claim with an analysis of the United Nations' substantive powers. The court 
then turned to an examination of whether the practice of states has allowed the use of those 
powers. 
48. See The International Status of Palestine, supra note 29, at 964. 
49. The Mandate for Palestine imposed upon the agency duties relating to the settlement 
of Jews in Palestine, development of the area's natural resources, construction and operation 
of public works facilities, and relating generally to "such economic, social, and other matters 
as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the interests of the Jewish 
population in Palestine ... . " League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine, arts. 4, 6, & 11, 
25 BRIT. SEss. PAPERS 421, CMo. No. 1785 (1922), reprinted in HUREWITZ, supra note 25, at 
106-11. 
50. In its 1946 report, the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry noted that the Agency 
had, at first, given the Palestine government effective cooperation, but: 
With its large revenue, its able administrators, advisors and staff, and its manifold 
11
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duties necessarily brought it into contact with individuals and 
governments outside Palestine, and these dealings solidified its 
public body status.52 Eventually, the Agency's standing became 
such that it could act in international forums both independently 
of the British government and without regard for the limitations 
which had previously been imposed upon its predecessor, the 
Zionist Organization, by the Balfour Declaration and the Man-
date.53 
During the Mandate period, Palestinian Arabs were repre-
sented directly and indirectly in international affairs (especially in 
Great Britain) by numerous individuals and groups. 54 British poli-
cies, however, "hindered the development of permanent, structured 
organs to articulate the Arab viewpoint."55 Although the Arabs de-
sired that Palestine be an Arab country, and sought the "establish-
ment of a national representative government in Palestine, " 56 Brit-
ain, for instance, refused to recognize two important Arab political 
organizations, the Arab Executive (1920-1934) and the Arab Higher 
Committee (formed in 1936),57 either of which might have served as 
activities, the Agency became finally and still remains the most potent non-
governmental authority in the Middle East. 
Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Report to the United States Government and His 
Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 20-21 (Dep't of State Publication 2536; Near 
Eastern Series 2, 1946). 
51. The Anglo-American Committee reported that: 
The Jews have developed, under the aegis of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi 
(the legislative body of the Jewish Community in Palestine), a strong and tightly-
woven community. There thus exists a virtual Jewish non-territorial state with its 
own executive and legislative organs, parallel in many respects to the Mandatory 
Administration, and serving as the concrete symbol of the Jewish National Home. 
Id. at 39. 
52. When the Zionist Organization, under the Mandate, was granted certain public 
works concessions, a dispute arose with a Greek subject who had been granted the concessions 
by the Ottoman government of Turkey. The Mandatory Administration invited the Greek to 
negotiate directly with the Organization. When the negotiations failed, the Greek government 
took up its subject's claims before the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Court 
concluded that the Jewish Agency (the Zionist Organization's successor) "is in reality a 
public body, closely connected with the Palestine Administration ... " and thus had stand-
ing to be a party to the negotiations. Case of the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, [1924] 
P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 2, at 21. 
53. Mallison, supra note 11, at 571, 577. 
54. See generally Lesch, supra note 24, at 25-40. 
55. Id. at 20. 
56. Arab Delegation memorandum to His Majesty's Government, circulated in Pales-
tine, August 1923, enclosed in Political Report, August 1923 (CO 733/49); quoted in Lesch, 
supra note 24, at 28. 
57. Lesch, supra note 24, at 20. According to Sir Herbert Samuel, as of 1924 the Arabs 
of Palestine had not been granted majority representation on the Legislative Council of 
Palestine because they had declared that if they had a majority they would use it to oppose 
12
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the core of the hoped-for government. The Arabs, on the other hand, 
in what typified their relations with the British, rejected British 
proposals to establish an "Arab Agency" because to do so would 
signal their acceptance of the Mandate. 58 Thus, the Mandate period 
saw the Arabs of Palestine negotiating with established govern-
ments, yet, unlike the Jews, their posture was basically defensive 
and those who tried to speak for them were not always taken as 
being their representatives.59 
From 1948 until 1964, the .international contacts of the Pales-
tinians as a people were even more confined, being limited mainly 
to the Arab League Council, which had appointed its own envoy 
from Palestine.60 The cause of Palestine was, at that time, an "Arab 
Cause, "61 while Palestinians, who were dispersed and in political 
disagreement, were predominantly concerned with the ideals of 
Arab unity.62 
But in January 1964, creation of the Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization was authorized at an Arab summit conference pursuant 
to an Arab League Council decision of the previous September to 
"affirm a Palestinian entity and place the cause ofliberation in the 
establishment of the Jewish National Home, and "it was not possible to afford them an 
opportunity of acting in a way that was hostile to this (the National Home) requirement of 
the mandate." League of Nations Permanent Mandates Commission, Minutes of the 5th 
Session (Extraordinary), 9th Meeting, A. 13 1924 VI, at 65. 
58. Id. at 27-28. 
59. The defensive posture of the Arabs is implicit in Lesch's description of their contacts 
with the British government. Id. at 25-40. See also SALEEBY, supra note 18, at 44, 48 n .18; 
and HuREWITZ, supra note 25, at 219. 
Regarding the status of the Arab delegations in British eyes, Lesch reports that: 
In crises, the British did negotiate with the Arab leaders as the de facto spokesmen 
of their community, but in quiet periods the British could ignore the Arab political 
bodies or encourage moderates to develop opposition groups. 
Lesch, supra note 24, at 21. Lesch quotes one contemporary report as noting: 
Under a semi-parliamentary regime [the British government would] be forced to 
heed [the Arabs'] protests, inasmuch as they would have that guise of representative 
opinion that they could now be said to lack. 
Commentary in Near East and India, London, December 15, 1932, entered in CO records (CO 
733/223/97258); quoted in Lesch, supra note 24, at 21. 
60. In 1945, upon creation of the Arab League, the de jure independence of Palestine was 
recognized by the League, and this organization of Arab states, itself, appointed a representa-
tive from Palestine. L. KADI, ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCES AND THE PALESTINE PROBLEM 16-19 
(1966) [hereinafter cited as KADI]. When an Arab Government of All Palestine was pro-
claimed in 1948, member states of the League recognized the government and invited its 
presence at sessions of the Arab League Council. B. SHWANDRAN, JORDAN: A STATE OF TENSION 
267 (1959) [hereinafter cited as SHWANDRAN]. 
61. QUANDT, supra note 27, 49-50. 
62. Id. 
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hands of the Palestinians themselves."63 The following May, a Pal-
estine National Congress met in Jerusalem and adopted a charter 
stating that the PLO: 
shall be responsible for the direction of the Palestinian people in its 
struggle for the liberation of its homeland, in all liberational, politi-
cal, and financial fields and also for whatever measures may be 
required by the Palestine case on the inter-Arab and international 
levels. 64 
The Congress immediately notified U.N. Secretary General U 
Thant that the PLO would be "the only legitimate spokesman for 
all matters concerning the Palestine people."65 
Today, after prevailing in challenges for Palestinian leadership 
and having undergone major changes of composition,66 the PLO 
retains the support of the Arab League67 and has increasingly been 
allowed to act on the international plane as the exclusive agent of 
the Palestinian people. It has been accepted as an observer-member 
of the organization of non-aligned countries, 68 and has been invited 
to participate in numerous international conferences. 69 Its chair-
man, Yasser Arafat, attended the Second Islamic Summit Confer-
ence in February 1974,70 has negotiated with government officials in 
the Soviet Union, East Germany, Poland71 and France72 and was 
invited to and did address the United Nations General Assembly. 73 
These practices of states individually and collectively made it in-
creasingly acceptable to deal with the PLO and provided a founda-
tion for the more formal steps of recognition which were to follow. 
The concept of consent manifested in practice, while indefinite 
and unpredictable, is not without value as a determinant of interna-
tional law and legal relations. Like its counterpart in commercial 
law, customs and usage of trade, practice looks to the needs and 
63. J. COOLEY, GREEN MARCH, BLACK SEPTEMBER: THE STORY OF THE PALESTINIAN ARABS 
95 (1973). 
64. KADI, supra note 60, at 108. 
65. Id. at 106. 
66. Quandt, supra note 27, at 67-73. 
67. PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, THE PLO: THE SOLE LEGITIMATE REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as PLO]. 
68. Id. at 10. 
69. G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/L.742 and Add.1 (1974). 
See also 56 U.N. ECOSOC 1835 & 1840, 56 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 1, 3, U.N. Doc. E/5544 
(1974). 
70. PLO, supra note 67, at 10-11. 
71. Id. at 11-14. 
72. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1974, at 6, col. 1. 
73. G.A. Res. 3210, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/L.736 and Add. 1 & 2 
(1974). 
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realities of the community while putting aside value judgments and 
abstract criteria.74 It thus takes on the virtues of an "invisible hand" 
as it theoretically reflects and balances competing needs. 
The needs in the cases of the Zionist Organization/Jewish 
Agency and of the PLO are not difficult to identify. In the former, 
the world's awareness of the Jewish "problem," painfully renewed 
by World War II; the immediate post-war need to-provide for and 
resettle some 250,000 displaced European Jews; and the considera-
ble political pressures wielded by Jews were among the factors 
which led the world community to approve the establishment of a 
separate Jewish state in Palestine. 75 In the case of the PLO, interna-
tional terrorism, largely at the hands of too-long-ignored Palestinian 
refugees; the threat of war between the major powers; and the use 
of the oil weapon contributed to a need felt almost universally to 
deal with the Palestine question, and thus presumably to deal with 
the Palestinians. 
Yet, reliance on the practice of states to reflect the needs of the 
community is not as healthy a concept as it might seem. Practice, 
in this sense, is not the practice of custom, where the habits of states 
are based on convictions that certain actions are obligatory or 
right. 76 And the needs, while perhaps genuine, are not necessarily 
the higher needs for principle described by Lauterpacht as arising 
from the existence of "a community of states under the rule of 
law. " 77 Practice, in short, need not be based on the "reason of the 
74. The needs and realities referred to are those political, social and economic factors 
which motivate the everyday conduct of states on the international plane (e.g., the need for 
Americans to keep their automobile gas tanks full). It should be noted that these are not the 
same needs and realities cited by Lauterpacht as a secondary source of international law. See 
text accompanying n"ote 77 infra. 
75. Although the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine recommended that 
"[a]ny solution for Palestine cannot be considered as a solution of the Jewish problem in 
general," 1 U.N. S.C.O.P. Report to the General Assembly, Supp. 11, at 46, U.N. Doc. N364 
(1947) [hereinafter cited as UNSCOP Report], the "problem" was clearly on the commit-
tee's mind when it foresaw partition of Palestine and creation of a Jewish State as a means 
of dealing with persons displaced by the war-most of them Jews-who could not (and did 
not want to be) reabsorbed in large numbers into their German or Austrian communities for 
fear of anti-Semitism. Almost universally they reportedly favored immigration to Palestine. 
UNSCOP Report, supra at 44; see Subcommittee 3's Report to UNSCOP, NAC. 13/SC. 3/5, 
in 2 U.N. S.C.O.P. Report to the General Assembly, Supp. 11, at 14-17, U.N. Doc. N364 Add. 
1 (1974). In addition to the sentiments of the displaced persons, Jews in the United States 
and elsewhere exerted tremendous political pressure to obtain international approval for 
establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. See, e.g., H. TRUMAN, 2 MEMOIRS 156-59 (1956). 
76. OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 26. 
77. LAUTERPACHT, The Definition and Nature of International Law, supra note 34, at 54. 
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law" and the needs which motivate it may be contrived as well as 
real, political as well as moral. 
C. Obtain Formal Recognition as the People's Representative 
What was implicitly accepted in the participation stage above 
may be declared and made official in a process similar to, but short 
of, full diplomatic recognition. In this process, states and interna-
tional organizations formally recognize a public body as the princi-
pal, if not exclusive, agent of the people in question. The effect is 
analogous to that of diplomatic recognition-an ascertainment of 
the fact that a people exists as a subject of international law7s and 
that the entity representing them is a public body which now has 
legal standing. The number of states, or status of organization re-
quired for the purpose-or for determining whether there is con-
sent-is unclear. 79 What is clear from the PLO experience, is that 
many small states, especially in the context of the United Nations, 
may be just as influential as a few large states.so 
The British government in its Balfour Declaration of 1917 im-
plicitly recognized the Zionist Organization as a public body repre-
senting the Jewish people.st This declaration served to secure the 
Organization's place at the Paris Peace Conference,s2 and its 
78. See H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 279 (1952) [hereinafter cited as 
KELSEN). 
79. 'Common consent' can therefore only mean the express or tacit consent of such 
an overwhelming majority of the members [of the community] that those who 
dissent are of no importance as compared with the community viewed as an entity 
in contradistinction to the wills of its single members. 
OPPENHEIM, supra note 3, at 17. In each particular case, the existence of consent is a question 
of fact and "a matter of observation and appreciation, and not logical and mathematical 
decision ... . "Id. 
80. The votes in the United Nations General Assembly on Resolutions 3236 and 3237 
(which recognized the right to self-determination and national sovereignty of the Palestinian 
people and gave the PLO observer status in the Assembly) were 89 for, 8 against, 37 abstain-
ing; and 95 for, 17 against, and 19 abstaining, respectively. The major western powers and 
Japan voted against or abstained on both resolutions. G.A. Res. 3236 & 3237, 29 U.N. A/PV. 
2282, at 10-12, U.N. Doc. A/5194 (1974). 
81. The Zionist Organization, according to Mallison, was "claimed to be a public body 
representing all Jews from its inception." Mallison, supra note 11, at 567. Thus: 
[The Balfour Declaration] manifests the British view that the Organization had 
the juridical status to receive the political promise clause [establishment of a Jewish 
National Home in Palestine] as well as to be subjected to the legal limitations 
embodied in the safeguards [protection for the Arabs of Palestine and for the Jews 
living outside Palestine]. 
Id. at 567-68. 
82. See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
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participation in the drafting of the Mandate for Palestine.8:1 It was 
the Mandate itself, however, with its provision for the Zionist Or-
ganization to be "the appropriate Jewish agency (to cooperate with 
the Mandatory),"84 which is said to have officially confirmed the 
Organization as a public body. 85 This status was judicially affirmed 
by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its Mavromma-
tis Palestine Concessions Case. 86 
The Palestine Liberation Organization has similarly been ac-
corded recognition as the representative of the Palestinian people, 
first by individual states and groups of states and later by interna-
tional organizations. Following establishment of the PLO in 1964, 
the Arab states welcomed it as "a support for the Palestine entity 
and a vanguard of the joint Arab struggle to liberate Palestine."87 
In March 1965, the People's Republic of China recognized the PLO 
as "a national institution representing the struggle of the people of 
Palestine for their country."88 Stronger endorsements have subse-
quently come from several European socialist states, including the 
Soviet Union, from such groups as that of the organization of non-
aligned countries, the Organization of African Unity, the Afro-Asian 
Peoples' Solidarity Organization, 89 and from the Arab League. 90 
These instances of state and organizational recognition laid the 
foundation for a statement by the United Nations General Assem-
bly that the PLO is "the representative of the people of Palestine, " 91 
and for an invitation from the General Assembly for the PLO to 
participate in its work as an observer. 92 
What lies behind the recognition-the criteria upon which this 
factual decision is made-is a subject generally beyond the scope of 
this Comment. Two matters in this respect are worthy of notice, 
however. First, recognition, like practice, may be as much or more 
83. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
84. League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine, art. 4, supra note 49. 
85. Cf. Mallison, supra note 11, at 570. 
86. See note 52 supra. 
87. From the final communique of the Arab Summit Conference at Alexandria, Sept. 
11, 1964, quoted in KADI, supra note 60, at 139. 
88. KADI, supra note 60, at 167. 
89. PLO, supra note 67, at 10-11. According to a publication of the Arab Information 
Center, Washington, D.C., the PLO "has been recognised by 74 non-aligned countries, 42 
African States, all Muslim States, and all Socialist countries." 1 ARAB REPORT 3 (Dec. 15, 
1974) [hereinafter cited as ARAB REPORT]. There seems to be some overlap. 
90. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1974, at 1, col. 8. 
91. G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/L.741 and Add.1 (1974). 
92. G.A. Res. 3237, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/L.742 and Add.l (1974). 
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forced by circumstances and need, as it is derived from a careful 
analysis of fact or principle. The exigencies of a wartime situation, 
for example, or the arm-twisting of an oil embargo may yield deci-
sions of expedience in this area as much as in any other.93 
Notwithstanding the above, recognition does imply the conclu-
sion that in some more or less imperfect way the entity which pur-
ports to speak for a people really is their representative. The two 
organizations under study appear to meet this criteria in approxi-
mately equal measure. The Zionist Organization was guided by a 
Congress which drew representatives from Jewish communities 
throughout the world.94 Likewise, the base of the PLO's decision-
making process is a National Congress to which representatives are 
said to be elected from a wide range of social, political and profes-
sional organizations in states containing Palestinian communities. 95 
Recognition, though basically of a fact already established by 
other practices, is an important step in itself. When the recognition 
is accorded by states (but more often when it is granted by organiza-
tions) it allows a people officially to become part of the international 
decision-making process and gives a sense of illegitimacy to agree-
ments reached without them.96 It enhances the prestige of their 
representative entity, and does so partly by downplaying the relev-
ance of its less-widely-condoned activities. Finally, recognition puts 
political pressure upon states which previously had withheld from 
dealing with that entity, to reconsider their positions.97 
Depending upon the nature and stategy of the representative 
body which is aspiring to legal standing, formal recognition may not 
be entirely advantageous. Recognition is likely, for instance, to 
93. The United States' recognition of the National Council of the Czechoslovak People 
in September 1918, which Council at the time was "no more than a provisional and absentee 
government with headquarters in Washington ... " is such an example. Of this Fenwick 
commented, "Only the exigencies of war could have justified such a measure consistently 
with the precedents of international law." FENWICK, supra note 32, at 106. 
94. COHEN, supra note 12, at 75-76. 
95. ARAB REPORT, supra note 89, at 1. There were, of course, both Jews and Palestinians 
who disagreed with the aims or policies of their respective organisations and who therefore 
did not participate in the processes described in the text. See COHEN, supra note 12, at 74-75 
and KADI, supra note 60, at 105. 
96. Although the United States has thus far declined to recognize or (as far as is known) 
negotiate with the PLO, Arab diplomats were reported to have concluded that the elevated 
status granted the PLO at the October 1974 Arab summit conference would force the United 
States to deal directly with that organization. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1974, at 18, col. 2. 
97. On Jan. 10, 1975, less than two months after the United Nations' action referred to 
in the text accompanying notes 91 and 92 supra, India responded to a PLO request, reportedly 
made "some time back," and recognized the PLO. N.Y. Times, Jan. 11, 1975, at 3, col. 1. 
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oblige the entity to begin assuming international responsibili-
ties-the "other side" of being a subject of international law. The 
Mandate for Palestine made the Zionist Organization "subject al-
ways to the control of the (British) Administration," and allowed it 
to be the Jewish agency for Palestine only "so long as its organiza-
tion and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropri-
ate. "98 Similarly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 
of November 21, 1974 recognized that the Palestinian people are 
entitled to "regain (their) rights" but extended that recognition only 
to those "means" which are "in accordance with the purposes and 
principles of the Charter .... " 99 The PLO's status in general is 
seen as also likely to temper its international behavior .100 
Formal recognition would appear to be a satisfactory outcome 
of an entity's drive for international legal standing. But recognition 
alone does not guarantee full procedural rights, nor will such proce-
dural rights as are obtained be of value without international recog-
nition of certain substantive rights to which the organization may 
be entitled. In fact, in order for the entity seeking territorial sover-
eignty to even be dealt with or recognized as a public body, it, or 
the people it represents, must have some arguable claim to a funda-
mental right available at international law. It has been suggested 
that such a fundamental right is the people's entitlement to their 
own institutions of self-government, in other words, to political self-
determination. 101 
D. Be Entitled as a People to the Right to Self-Determination 
Among the various elements of the Zionist Organization's Jew-
ish National Home proposal were claims for what translates into the 
right to self-determination for the Jewish people. 102 Although it is 
98. League of Nations, Mandate for Palestine, art. 4, supra note 49, at 108. 
99. G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/L.741 and Add.1 
(1974). 
100. N .Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1974, at 18, col. 5. 
101. It has been suggested that self-determination is the sine qua non of all other rights 
which a people as a non-sovereign entity may acquire. D. N1Nc1c, THE PROBLEM OF SOVER-
EIGNTY IN THE CHARTER AND IN THE PRACTICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 253-54 (1970). 
102. Self-determination has been defined as: 
[T]he process by which a group of people, usually possessing a certain degree of 
national consciousness, form their own state and choose their own government. 
9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 41 (1974). 
The Zionist claim of entitlement to this principle, as it was then termed, was implicit in 
Herzl's writing (supra note 12), in the Basle Declaration (see text accompanying note 13 
supra), and in the Zionist Organization's Memorandum to the Supreme Council at the Paris 
Peace Conference. HuREWITZ, supra note 25, at 45-50. 
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generally agreed that self-determination did not exist at the time as 
a "right" at international law103 (as it appears to exist today 104), the 
concept, at least, was both familiar and in limited use.1°5 The oppor-
tunity for, if not the right to, self-determination was granted the 
Jewish people by the Mandate provision for substantial Jewish 
immigration into Palestine. 106 It has also been argued that the dis-
tinct absence from the Mandate of requirements for bringing about 
103. Fenwick argued in 1924 that a "right of self-determination" had "not attained the 
validity of a legal rule." FENWICK, supra note 32, at 106-07. Professor Green argues that such 
a right does not even exist today in customary (positive) international law, although he 
concedes that such a right may be "in nascendi" as evidenced by United Nations General 
Assembly resolutions. Green, Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Confiict, 
65 AM. J . lNT'L L. 40, 46 (1971). 
104. Professor Green's arguments, supra note 103, to the contrary, there does appear to 
be a "right" to self-determination recognized at international law. Article 1 of the United 
Nations Charter, for example, states that one of the purposes of the United Nations is [t]o 
develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination of peoples .... " U.N. CHARTER art. 1. 
That this right is not exclusively applicable to states, but is available also to individuals 
constituted as an identifiable people is evidenced by a host of United Nations resolutions 
conferring a "right" to self-determination upon such groups and citing Article 1 as the source 
of their authority. A 1970 resolution concerning Palestine, for example, stated: 
The General Assembly 
Bearing in mind the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples 
enshrined in Articles 1 and 55 of the Charter ... , 
1. Recognizes that the people of Palestine are entitled to equal rights and self-
determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
G.A. Res. 2672 C, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 36, U.N. Doc. N8204/Add. 1 (1970). 
One observer has recently concluded: 
[S]elf-determination in international law is . . . synonymous with the right of non-
self-governing territories to independence. Such territories can easily be distin-
guished by virtue to [sic] their being geographically and racially distinct from the 
metropolitan country which governs them, but with which these 'territories do not 
share political power. 
Mustafa, The Principle of Self-Determination in International Law, 5 lNT'L LAW. 479, 486-87 
(1971). 
105. The concept of self-determination had been articulated as one of the four goals for 
which the Allies were fighting in World War I. See President Woodrow Wilson's Address of 
July 4, 1918, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1918, at 1, col. 2-3. The concept underlay the minorities 
treaties and great power intervention in the Balkans. FENWICK, supra note 32, at 107. And it 
was institutionalised in the mandate provisions (Art. 22) of the League of Nations Covenant. 
Article 22 refers to the "well-being and development" of the peoples who were formerly 
subjects of the defeated powers as being a "sacred trust of civilization," and provisionally 
recognized the independence of some such communities. HUREWITZ, supra note 25, at 62. 
106. Provisions for large scale Jewish immigration into Palestine and the distinct ab-
sence from the Mandate of requirements for ending the Mandate and bringing this immigra-
tion to a halt provide support for this observation. See THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST 274-
75 (B. Rivlin and J. Szyliowicz eds. 1965) [hereinafter cited as THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE 
EAST]. 
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the early independence of Palestine extended that opportunity for 
self-determination. 107 
Similarly, the Palestinians base their claim to the right to self-
determination upon a substantial body of international practice and 
pronouncement, 108 including a United Nations resolution referring 
specifically to the "inalienable right" of the Palestinian people to 
"self-determination."109 
Although a right to self-determination has been declared appl-
icable to "all people, " 110 not every group has a right to its own state 
sovereignty. 111 The criteria described above 112 must in some sense be 
applied in order to distinguish a "people" from a mere minority 
group. It has again been suggested, however, that practice should 
be the determinant, practice here being defined as a people's prepa-
ration and capacity (and, it would seem, willingness) to "struggle 
for self-determination."113 Palestinian experience in this respect has 
been mixed. Recent United Nations General Assembly debates, for 
instance, reveal international support for the Palestinians based 
107. Under Article 1 of the Syrian and Iraqi mandates, the mandatory was required to 
frame an organic law within three years of the coming into force of the mandate and was "to 
facilitate the progressive development" of those countries "as independent states." Compara-
ble clauses were lacking in the Palestine instrument, which, on the contrary, vested in the 
mandatory for an indefinite period "full powers of legislation and administration, save as they 
may be limited by the terms of this mandate." HuREWITZ, supra note 25, at 107. This omis-
sion, coupled with the immigration provisions mentioned in the text accompanying note 106 
supra, appears to indicate the intent of the League to maintain the Mandate until a Jewish 
National Home had been established. See THE CONTEMPORARY MIDDLE EAST, supra note 
106, at 272. However, the British government in its 1922 policy statement, supra note 25, at 
104, placed a narrow construction on the term "Jewish National Home," indicating that a 
"Home" was not to be considered a sovereign Jewish state. 
108. The Palestinians cite British pledges of independence and self-governance con-
tained in the McMahon correspondence and 1922 and 1939 policy statements of the British 
government, and Article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant. See note 25, supra. They also 
base their claim on the United Nations Charter (supra note 104); the Partition Plan, which 
called for creation of independent Arab and Jewish states in the area of Mandatory Palestine 
west of the Jordan River [G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. N519, at 131 (1974)]; and upon numerous 
other United Nations declarations and resolutions of a general nature. See, e.g., United 
Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 28, at 122-24, U.N. Doc. N8082 (1970); 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
28, at 36, UN Doc. N8204/Add. 1 (1970). 
109. G.A. Res. 2672 C, G.A. Res. 2963 E, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 29, U.N. Doc. 
N8730 (1972). 
110. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 A, 21 U.N. 
GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. N6316 opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966. 
111. N1Nc1c, supra note 101, at 252-53. 
112. See subsection A of text. 
113. See N1Nc1c, supra note 101, at 253. 
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upon both arguments as to history and policy and evidence of the 
people's willingness to "struggle" for statehood. 114 
If a determination of rights is left to practice, there is no need 
to wrestle with the secondary matter of implementation. This is 
particularly true with what are essentially civil wars or revolutions 
against colonial powers, in which groups within a given territory are 
contending for that territory's control or sub-division. 115 But there 
are also instances, like the one in question, where one of the con-
tending groups is located essentially outside the territory on which 
it proposes to exercise its self-rule. 116 Under these circumstances, 
with world peace at stake, the better part of wisdom may be to give 
practice a lower priority as a means of implementation, and to seek 
a less precarious alternative. 
E. Acquire an International Commitment to the People's Right to 
Territorial Sovereignty 
One such alternative-international fiat in the form of the Par-
tition Plan-has been attempted in the Middle East, but did not 
succeed in avoiding violence. A step short of that, taken recently 
with regard to the Palestinians, is an international commitment to 
114. United Nations General Assembly 2295th and 2296th Plenary Meetings (XXIX), 
Press Releases GN5152 and GN5153 of Nov. 21 and 22, 1974. 
115. The means of implementation of a people's self-determination may include, for 
instance, a plebiscite or an armed struggle. If the outcome of the latter has been used to 
determine a people's eligibility for the right, it has already also solved the problem of imple-
mentation. 
116. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3236 of Nov. 22, 1974 speaks of the 
"Palestinian people in Palestine," reaffirms their "inalienable rights" to return to their 
homes, and "calls for their return." In debate concerning the resolution, the ambassador from 
Barbados reportedly commented: 
His delegation knew that the Palestinian people existed, but where was Palestine? 
he said. If Palestine did not exist, then what did the co-sponsors mean in referring 
to the "Palestinian People in Palestine"? he asked . . . . [W]hen the draft dealt 
with their return, [he] had to ask: their return where? 
United Nations General Assembly 2296th Plenary Meeting (XXIX), Press Release GN5153, 
Take 8, 22 Nov. 1974. 
The idea that self-rule is meaningless without territorial sovereignty should not be ele-
vated to the level of a law of nature. Although it appears to be a self-evident proposition, 
Professor Hall suggests that it became an "inevitable" assumption because at the time 
international law was being formulated, "no instances were present of civilised communities 
without fixed seats." HALL, supra note 3, at 19. The reference to "civilized" countries provides 
an interesting point of contrast because, according to Professor al Ghunaimi, the Muslims 
traditionally "did not consider a fixed territory as an essential element in the structure of 
the state." AL GHUNAIMI, THE MUSI.IM CONCEPTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WESTERN 
APPROACH 64 (1968). 
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the people's right to national sovereignty without specific proposals 
as to implementation of that right. 117 Such a commitment, however 
limited, gives the stamp of legitimacy to efforts by that people to 
acquire territory on which to exercise self-rule. It may also provide 
some authority for intervention by established states in support of 
that people. 
Although it is arguable that a commitment of this kind was 
contained in the Mandate promise of a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine, 118 an international undertaking to this effect is more 
clearly evident in the 1947 United Nations Partition Plan. 119 The 
plan, which is based upon a General Assembly resolution considered 
invalid by the Arabs, 120 is cited by Israel as one of the legal bases 
for its existence. 121 Some scholars have conceptually upheld it as an 
international act of eminent domain, 122 but the plan appears more 
likely to have been an exercise of what was still essentially colonial 
power, and it is unlikely that it could be repeated today. 
The plan was not without limitations and qualifications for its 
beneficiaries, however. Territory granted therein for the Jewish 
State was little more than half the portion of Palestine originally 
opened for Jewish settlement.123 In addition, terms of the resolution 
117. See notes 132 and 133 infra. 
118. The argument that the Mandate was a commitment of sovereignty to the Jews 
follows from the propositions discussed in the text accompanying note 106 and in note 107 
supra. 
119. Part I, A., 3 of the Partition Plan provides that: 
Independent Arab and Jewish States ... shall come into existence in Palestine two 
months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the Mandatory Power has been 
completed but in any case not later than 1 Oct. 1948. 
G.A. Res. 181, U.N. Doc. A/519 at 131, 133 (1947). 
120. According to Elaraby, first Secretary of the United Arab Republic Mission to the 
United Nations, the resolution was invalid because United Nations Charter provisions (arts. 
10, 11, 12, and 14) limit General Assembly power in such matters to that of making recom-
mendations only. Elaraby, Some Legal Implications of the 1947 Partition Resolution and the 
1949 Armistice Agreements, in THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: TEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 102 
(J. Halderman ed. 1969). 
121. The Proclamation of Independence of the State of Israel traces development of "the 
right of the Jewish People to a national revival in their own country" from its proclamation 
by the First Zionist Congress, through its "acknowledgement" in the Balfour Declaration, its 
"reaffirmation" by the Mandate for Palestine, and to its "unassailable recognition" by the 
United Nations in the Partition Resolution. THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER, supra note 12, at 126. 
122. See Kutner, International Eminent Domain, 16 CATH. LAW. 296, 311 (1970); Wein-
feld, Eminent Domain Among Peoples, A Jewish State in Palestine and Arab Self-
Determination, 21 TEMP. L.Q. 223, 232-33 (1947-48) . 
123. While the Mandate's Jewish Home provisions applied to all of the territory of 
Palestine west of the Jordan River, the Partition Plan granted Jews only about 56% of that 
territory. Elaraby, supra note 125, at 102. 
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required that Arabs be granted citizenship in the Jewish State, if 
that is where they were living at the time of partition; that they be 
granted equal rights; and that their property not be taken except 
for public purposes and then only with full compensation. 124 How-
ever qualified and whatever its validity, the Plan nevertheless pro-
vided an interim basis of legality for the State of Israel. 125 
The Partition Plan offered a commitment of territorial sover-
eignty-similar in terms to that offered the Jews-to the Arabs of 
Palestine, 128 but the Arabs declined to accept the proposal. Some 
scholars have advanced the idea that a territorial commitment to 
the Arabs actually existed in the Mandate provision limiting Jewish 
settlement to Cisjordan, the area of Palestine west of the Jordan 
River; and that the commitment was fulfilled in Britain's 1946 grant 
of independence to Transjordan, the area of Mandatory Palestine 
lying east of the Jordan. 127 The problem with this analysis from the 
124. See Part I, B., lO(d), Part I, C., ch. 2.8, and Part I, C., ch. 3.1 of the Partition Plan 
for provisions concerning equal rights, expropriation, and citizenship in the proposed Arab 
and Jewish states. THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER, supra note 12, at 117; 120, 121. 
125. According to Professor Wright, the justifiability of the original Arab objection to 
partition can hardly be questioned, but Israel subsequently attained other grounds on which 
to rest her claim to legitimacy. Wright, The Middle East Problem, 4 INT'L LAW 364, 370 (1970) 
[hereinafter cited as Wright]. 
126. See note 119 supra. 
127. The Mandate provision referred to is Article 25, which permits the Mandatory to 
withhold application of Mandate stipulations in the area between the Jordan River and the 
eastern boundary of Palestine. The circumstances which led to Article 25's insertion indicate 
it was intended to apply to the Jewish National Home provisions. HuREWITZ, supra note 25, 
at 111, 107. 
Jordan's role in the Palestine problem is interesting and infrequently mentioned. It is 
succinctly stated by Professor Reisman: 
The agony of the Palestinian people did not begin in 1922 with the . . . Mandate 
.... It began in 1921 when Winston Churchill gave five thousand pounds a month 
to the Emir Abdullah and a small state to spend it on to stop Abdullah from waging 
war on the French in Syria. Abdullah was a Hashemite from Saudi Arabia; he was 
simply set on top of the Palestinians in that region. 
Symposium on Self-Determination and Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Confiict, 65 AM. J . 
INT'L L. No. 4, at 31, 49 (1971). 
The "small state" became the country of Transjordan (Jordan today) in 1946 when Great 
Britain granted it independence under Hashemite rule. Following the 1948 war, Jordan, 
which had conquered some of the West Bank territory slated for the proposed Arab State, 
annexed that territory following elections in which Palestinian residents voted. SHWANDRAN, 
supra note 60, at 246, 269, 286, 291-92, 295-97. See generally note 29 supra. 
From the standpoint of international law, the basis of the act of incorporation 
[Jordan's incorporation of the West Bank] appears to have been the preceding 
administration of the area by Jordan, followed by the expressed animus of sover-
eignty. Treated as an instance of acquisitive prescription, the problem presents itself 
of finding an alternative claimant whose acquiescence may be presumed; the Arab 
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Palestinian point of view was not only that it required a permanent 
renunciation of title to their land in Cisjordan, but also that at the 
time of partition Transjordan was economically backward with little 
prospect for growth128 and was ruled by the House of Hashim, an 
essentially foreign administration for which the Palestinians held no 
affection. 129 Whether or not those who framed the Mandate intended 
State envisaged in the [General] Assembly Resolution, many of whose potential 
citizens voted in the general election, would appear to have been the only contender. 
Alternatively, may the West Bank be regarded as res nullius, open to occupation by 
the first State to establish effective administration? 
The International Status of Palestine, supra note 29, at 980. This matter is analytically 
treated in Blum, supra note 29. 
According to Dr. Paul Riebenfeld, the Jordanian census taken in 1961 showed that of a 
total population of 1,640,039 citizens, 1,355,450 were of Palestinian origin. Of the latter, 
805,450 lived in the West Bank area and 550,000 lived in the territory of what was formerly 
Transjordan. In Riebenfeld's opinion: 
[E]ven today, with the West Bank in Israeli possession, eighty percent of the area 
of Palestine belongs to and is occupied by the Arabs of Palestine .... What is it 
that stands in the way of affirming the Palestinian character of Jordan, of the Pales-
tinians voting themselves into power? 
Symposium on Self-Determination and the Settlement of the Arab-Israeli Confiict, supra at 
60-62. 
Apparently, the government of Israel also, and not surprisingly, supports the concept 
that the Palestinians look to the territory of Jordan for purposes of self-determination. See 
Statements by the Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations at the United Nations General 
Assembly 2296th Plenary Meeting (XXIX), Press Release GN5153, Take 9, 22 Nov. 1974. 
128. Even the Jewish Agency concluded that Jordan was poorly suited for independent 
statehood. In a memorandum on Transjordan presented to the Anglo-American Committee 
of Inquiry on Palestine in 1947, the Agency said: 
In view of [the fact that the Amirate of Transjordan owes "its very existence" to the 
administrative and financial help provided by Great Britain and Palestine], the 
question may be asked whether a small community such as Transjordan, even iffully 
developed, could afford to possess all those public services which characterize a 
modern State. Any student of the country's affairs is bound to reach the conclusion 
that, in order to allow a grade of efficiency which is the raison d'etre and prerequi-
site of a State's independent existence, a wider political entity is required than is 
found here. 
THE JEWISH AGENCY FOR PALESTINE, THE JEWISH CASE BEFORE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE 
OF INQUIRY ON PALESTINE 630, 651 (1947) [hereinafter cited as THE JEWISH CASE]. 
129. Perhaps part of the answer to the question posed by Dr. Ribenfeld in note 131 supra 
lies in the deep differences which existed in 1948 between Transjordanian and Palestinian 
Arabs. See SHWANDRAN, supra note 60, at 300. These differences were later exacerbated by 
King Hussein's attempts to suppress the Palestinian movement within Jordan. QUANDT, 
supra note 27, at 128. Part of the answer may also lie in inter-Arab rivalry, particularly as 
between Jordan and other members of the Arab League. See generally SHWANDRAN, supra note 
60, at 221-99. Finally, part of the answer could lie in Arab motives for support of the Pales-
tinian cause. A statement by Arab leaders following their summit meeting in January 1964, 
for instance, asserted that: 
One way of repelling the threatening Zionist danger was through organization of the 
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Transjordan to be the Arab half of Palestine, the Partition Plan 
appears to have made irrelevant such intentions by providing for an 
Arab State in parts of the territory west of the Jordan River.tao The 
Arab invasion of 1948, some suggest, may have permanently de-
stroyed that Arab State. tat 
Nevertheless, the international commitment of sovereignty to 
the Palestinian Arabs has been revived. On October 28, 1974, the 
Arab heads of state, meeting in Rabat, Morocco, called for creation 
of an independent Palestinian state and gave the PLO sole responsi-
bility for any Palestinian-claimed territory relinquished by or liber-
ated from Israel. ta2 Shortly thereafter, on November 22, 1974, the 
United Nations General Assembly "[r]eaffirm[ed] the inalienable 
rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including: . . . (b) The 
right to national independence and sovereignty," and the right to 
return to their homes and property. taa This resolution makes no 
mention of the Partition Plan and has none of its specificity. The 
rights it confers however, like those offered to both sides in the 
Partition Plan, are qualified. ta4 
The "right to return," mentioned in the resolution, sounds 
much like proposals once advanced by the Jews and now by the 
Palestinians, ta5 which suggest that both groups exercise self-
determination within the same territory. ta6 While this idea is not 
Palestinian people, thus enabling it to play its part in liberating Palestine and in 
determining its future. 
KADI, supra note 60, at 101. This statement suggests at least two motives for organizing the 
Palestinians, one of which is clearly directed toward Israel. 
130. See note 119 supra. 
131. See Stone, Peace and the Palestinians, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & PoL. 247-48 (1970). 
132. N.Y. Times, Oct. 29, 1974, at 1, col. 8. 
133. G.A. Res. 3236, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 31, at 4, U.N. Doc. A/L.741 and Add.1 (1974). 
134. See note 99 supra. 
135. In an official statement of Zionist aims approved in September 1921, the Zionist 
Congress affirmed: 
[T]he determination of the Jewish people to live with the Arab people on terms of 
unity and mutual respect, and together with them to make the common home into a 
flourishing community, the upbuilding of which may assure to each of its peoples an 
undisturbed national development. 
Quoted in the 1922 Statement of British Policy on Palestine, supra note 25, at 104. 
The Palestine Liberation Organization has advocated establishment in Palestine of a 
"secular, democratic progressive society without distinction or discrimination as between 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims." Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 38. 
136. Professor Bassiouni advocates the "right of return" based upon the assumption that 
a right to self-determination vested with the Palestinian people while they were living in 
Palestine. He argues that the right is only exercisable when a "rational nexus" can be proven 
between a people and a given territory. Bassiouni, supra note 16, at 36. But the very basis 
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necessarily self-contradictory, 137 neither is it practical in the Middle 
East. The bitterness and suspicion between Palestinian and Jew, 
which was a reason for partition, 138 is clearly still an obstacle to a 
bi-national state. 139 More conclusive, however, are the apparent 
aspirations of Jews and Palestinians to mutually exclusive state-
hood.140 
Under these circumstances, and given the limitations which 
now exist on the exercise of international power, an international 
commitment to a people's right to national sovereignty may be no 
more useful today than as a bargaining tool in diplomatic negotia-
tions. As a tool, it notifies the party holding territory of the will of 
the international community-a community upon which that party 
depends for the exercise of its own legal rights. How effective such 
a commitment is remains to be seen. 
for providing Palestine as a "National Home" for the Jews was the "historical connection of 
the Jewish people with Palestine." HuREWITZ, supra note 25, at 107. 
137. Self-determination need not be equated with state sovereignty, although sover-
eignty is an aspect of self-determination. Nincic Jraws a distinction between "external" and 
"internal" aspects of self-determination. The former refers to self-government; the latter 
refers to the freedom of peoples to pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 
NINCIC, supra note 101, at 246-49. 
138. UNSCOP Report, supra note 75, at 47. 
139. In a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in response to a vote by 
that body to invite the PLO as an observer and to affirm the Palestinians' right to self-
determination, the Ambassador from Israel, comparing the Palestine Liberation Organization 
with the Nazis, said: 
The PLO murderers are their heirs in method and objective . 
. . . The only right that the PLO is prepared to grant Jews is to live as an oppressed 
minority in one more Arab State. 
United Nations General Assembly 2296th Plenary Meeting (XXIX), Press Release GA/5153, 
Take 13, 22 Nov. 1974. 
140. See, e.g., Statement of Dr. Chaim Weizmann in THE JEWISH CASE, supra note 128, 
at 3, 20-21. The Palestine Liberation Organization has advocated the establishment of a 
secular democratic state in Palestine which would not discriminate between Jews, Christians 
or Moslems. See note 135 supra. However, Article 6 of the Palestine National Covenant 
provides that only "Jews who were living permanently in Palestine until the beginning of the 
Zionist invasion will be considered Palestinians." The Zionist invasion was deemed to have 
begun at the time of the Balfour Declaration, 1917. See Harkabi, supra note 22, at 230-31. 
On the other hand, Yasser Arafat, in his speech before the United Nations General 
Assembly, said, referring to a state of Palestine as envisioned by the PLO: " ... we include 
in our perspective all Jews now living in Palestine who choose to live with us there in peace 
and without discrimination." PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION, ADDRESS BY MR. YASSER 
ARAFAT, 29TH SESSION UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 13, 1974, at 33. Clearly, 
whether the Palestinian Arab perspective includes full citizenship for all Jews remains an 
open question. Whether Israel would accept the secular democratic state idea of the PLO also 
remains in doubt. 
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F. Establish a Legal Order Over a Defined Population Within a 
Given Territory 
With standing established and rights acknowledged, a people 
may now be expected to use the means available in international 
affairs to gain sovereignty and statehood. To be recognized as a 
nation-state, however, the people must still establish a legal order 
over a defined population within a given territory. 141 While the 
means used to accomplish that objective are not relevant to the 
accordance of recognition once statehood has been established, 142 
the act of recognition does not necessarily validate any illegality in 
the method of acquiring the objective .143 
The Jewish Agency attained the territorial requisite for state-
hood essentially by purchase and public land reclamation, and was 
able to hold and enlarge upon that territory militarily, 144 but the 
area officially claimed for Israel was that which had been granted 
by the Partition Plan. 145 The population administered within that 
territory had been described in the Plan, 146 and the legal order im-
posed was essentially what had been established by the "shadow 
government" during the Mandate period. 147 
141. The traditional prerequisites for statehood are described by KELSEN, supra note 78, 
at 264-65. He defines a legal order as a centralized, coercive regime which regulates the 
behavior of the members of a community. Id. at 100-01. 
142. According to Professor Hall: 
[I]nternational law takes no cognizance of matters anterior to the acquisition of . . . 
[statehood], and is, consequently, indifferent to the means which a community may 
use to form itself into a state. 
HALL, supra note 3, at 20. 
143. Professor Kelsen distinguishes between recognition of a community as a state and 
recognition of a legal relationship between that state and another. The former involves the 
ascertainment of a legally relevant fact, while the latter "creates a law" applicable to the 
relationship between two states. In Kelsen's opinion, the latter cannot be accomplished by 
recognition because territorial change brought about illegally between two states cannot be 
validated by the recognition of a third state. KELSEN, supra note 78, at 293-94. 
144. For a brief description of Jewish land purchasing practices see SALEEBY, supra note 
18, at 46. For a detailed account of the 1947-49 War, see N. LORCH, THE EDGE OF THE SWORD 
(1961). 
145. See text accompanying note 159 infra. 
146. Part I, C., ch. 3 of the Partition Plan provided that: 
1. Citizenship. Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine ... shall, upon the recogni-
tion of independence, become citizens of the State of which they are resident . . 
THE ISRAEL-ARAB READER, supra note 12, at 121. 
147. See notes 50, 51 supra. 
The new ministries of government were direct transformations of the bureaus of pre-
viously existing institutions. The Political Department of the Jewish Agency became 
the Foreign Ministry; the Social Welfare Department of the National Assembly be-
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The Palestine Liberation Organization is moving toward this 
objective, though as yet it, like the many governments-in-exile 
which arose during the two world wars, has "no territory ... on 
which to find pied a terre. " 148 It has been suggested that the PLO 
will take the interim step of constituting a government-in-exile. 149 
Although the legal grounds for such a move are tenuous, 150 the Or-
ganization may find that there are sufficient practical reasons for 
doing so, and much of the world may be sufficiently sympathetic to 
approve. 151 Among the practical reasons is preparation to administer 
as a state the territory ceded by Jordan and Egypt should it be 
"liberated" from Israeli control. 152 Such preparation is likely to be 
more cosmetic than real, as the PLO already performs many of the 
administrative functions of a government, 153 but cosmetics generate 
their own realities. 
But being an identifiable people represented by an internation-
ally-recognized public body is far removed from possessing terri-
torial sovereignty and the attributes of statehood. For the Palestini-
ans, the task is made difficult not only by the absence of an interna-
tional grant of specific territory, but also by Israel's reluctance to 
came the Ministry of Social Welfare; the Hagannah [the Agency's defense arm] 
became the Israeli army. 
H. SACHAR, THE COURSE OF MODERN .JEWISH HISTORY 543 (1963). 
148. Brown, Sovereignty in Exile, 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 666, 667 (1941) [hereinafter cited 
as Brown]. 
149. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1974, at 18, col. 2. 
150. Kelsen describes a government-in-exile as one which has ceased to have effective 
control over its former territory, but which has maintained "effective" efforts to regain con-
trol. "Effective" efforts are defined as "sufficient [armed opposition] to prevent the control 
of the occupying power from becoming firmly established." KELSEN, supra note 78, at 288-
90. The PLO would appear not to have met the criterion of "effective" efforts to regain control 
and its links, in any case, to previous Arab governing authorities in Palestine are so thin as 
to make a legal claim to government-in-exile status virtually untenable. 
151. The moral or subjective grounds for recognizing a government-in-exile were de-
scribed by Brown in his editorial comment on European governments-in-exile during World 
War II: 
[S]o long as a people do not accept military conquest; so long as they can manifest, 
in one way or another, their inalterablewill to regain their freedom, their sovereignty, 
even though flouted, restricted, and sent into exile, still persists. . . . 
A nation is much more than an outward form of territory and government. It 
consists of the men and women in whom sovereignty resides. 
Brown, supra note 148, at 667-68. 
152. See text accompanying note 132 supra. 
153. According to the Arab Information Center, the PLO, in addition to having a regular 
legislative and executive apparatus, also collects taxes and builds and operates hospitals, 
schools, vocational and rehabilitation centers, and research centers. ARAB REPORT, supra note 
89, at 3. It also has a military arm. 
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surrender areas on two flanks to an organization, if not a people, 
which is opposed to her existence as a sovereign Jewish state. 154 
G. Receive International Recognition as a Territorial Sovereign 
Should the territorial requisite of statehood be acquired, diplo-
matic recognition will help secure it. Recognition, which is liberally 
defined as the "ascertainment of [a] fact," 155 may, particularly if 
coupled with United Nations membership, give a new state some 
degree of legal and political security. As a member of the com-
munity of nations, it is protected by the elementary rule that a 
violation of the sovereign rights of one is a violation of the rights of 
all. As a United Nations member, it is implicitly recognized as a 
state by all other members, 158 and under Art. 2, Sec. 4 of the United 
Nations Charter those members are prohibited from using force 
against its territorial integrity. 157 In practice, as is well known, this 
protection is not particularly effective, but neither is its effect en-
tirely negligible. 158 
The State of Israel, upon its declaration of independence, an-
nounced itself to the United States as "an independent republic 
within the frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations .... " 159 Although it has been "generally recog-
nized" as a state with title to the territory within those frontiers, 
there seems to be no such "general recognition" of its sovereignty 
over the additional territory it has acquired since then. 160 
154. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1974, at 18, col. 1. Article 19 of the Palestinian National 
Covenant states, "The partitioning of Palestine in 1947 and the establishment of Israel is 
fundamentally null and void." Article 9 declares, "Armed struggle is the only way to liberate 
Palestine and is therefore a strategy and not tactics." Harkabi, supra note 22, at 239, 233. 
155. KELSEN, supra note 78, at 279. 
156. Article 4 of the United Nations Charter specifies that membership in the United 
Nations is open to "all ... peace-loving states." (Emphasis added.) U.N. CHARTER art. 4. 
157. Article 2 of the United Nations Charter provides that: 
Id. 
4. All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
158. United Nations General Assembly delegates, explaining the positions they had 
taken when voting on G.A. Res. 3236 and 3237, expressed with near uniformity the under-
standing that although the Palestinians were now recognized as having certain rights in the 
Middle East, this fact did not put into question Israel's right to existence and to security. 
G.A. 2296th Plenary Meeting (XXIX), Press Release GA/5153, 22 Nov. 1974. 
159. 2 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 167 (1963). 
160. Wright, Legal Aspects of the Middle East Situation, in THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS: 
TEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 5, 18 (J.W. Halderman ed. 1969). 
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The United Nations accorded Israel recognition by admitting 
her as a member state (though not unqualifiedly). 161 But the United 
Nations has also refused, in effect, to recognize the extension of 
Israel's boundaries, at least beyond those which were held prior to 
the 1967 war. 162 
Although the Palestine Liberation Organization has not yet 
reached this stage, there can be little doubt, based upon support for 
it evidenced at the United Nations, 163 that it is likely to be widely 
and quickly recognised if it does achieve the requisites of statehood 
for the Palestinian people. 
While diplomatic recognition has been said to offer a modest 
amount of security, in the special case oflsrael (and as may be true 
in the event a Palestinian state comes into existence), diplomatic 
recognition and membership in the United Nations are something 
more akin to a guarantee of existence than is usually the case. The 
reason is to be found among the same factors which contributed to 
Israel's establishment and to the PLO's standing today, (i.e. com-
munity needs). Israel's existence is, in part, the international solu-
[A]cceptance [of the Partition Plan] by the U.N., the recognition of Israel by most 
states, the willingness of the Arabs at the Lausanne Conference, prior to the armistice 
of 1949, to accept Israel within the boundaries proposed in the original U.N. resolutions 
of 1947, the admission of Israel as a member of the U.N., and its continued existence 
as such for a period of twenty years, indicates that it must now be considered a 
sovereign state at international law. 
Id. at 370. 
161. Before admitting Israel to membership, the United Nations General Assembly re-
solved that Arab refugees wishing to return to their homes within Israel should be allowed to 
do so, and that compensation should be provided to those who did not wish to return. The 
General Assembly subsequently required assurances from the Israeli representative that his 
state would comply with the resolution. Only when it had those assurances did the Assembly 
vote to admit Israel. INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF DEMOCRATIC LAWYERS, THE MIDDLE EAST 
CONFLICT (NOTES AND DOCUMENTS, 1915-1967) 108-09 (1967). 
162. United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of Nov. 22, 1967 requires Israel to 
withdraw from "territories occupied" during the October 1967 war. 22 U.N. SCOR, 1350th 
meeting 8-9 (1967). 
Julius Stone observes, however: 
The definite articles missing from the phrase "Withdrawal of armed forces from terri-
tories occupied," in Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967, are as significant as the 
closely following reference to "secure and recognized boundaries" in the same Para-
graph 1 of that Resolution . . . . Not only deliberate omission of the definite articles, 
but the course of negotiation, indicates that the quoted phrase about withdrawal 
simply could not foreclose answers to the questions: What forces are to withdraw? 
From what territories? And when? 
Stone, Forward, in Y. BLUM, SECURE BOUNDARIES AND MIDDLE EAST PEACE 9 (1971). 
163. See note 80 supra. 
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tion to an ancient human dilemma. 164 The Palestinian problem is 
another dilemma, not as old, but sufficiently intense that the inter-
national community is also being moved to deal with it. And it 
would make little sense to solve one dilemma by resurrecting the 
other. 165 
III. CONCLUSION 
The legal history of Jews and Palestinians with regard to Pales-
tine indicates that peoples may become the subjects of international 
law and be accorded rights thereunder if they obtain the consent of 
the international community .166 Consent, furthermore, is mani-
fested primarily in the evolving practice of states, and practice (as 
applied in this instance) appears to be far more closely wedded to 
circumstance and necessity than to rules, categories or formulas. 
Because this process has an existential nature, it is in a sense, 
what all people let it be. Thus, it could be just. But that possibility, 
like the salutary idea that a totalitarian state reflects the passively-
expressed will of its people, offers little comfort to those against 
164. Saleeby paraphrases one of Herzl's arguments for establishment of a Jewish state 
as follows: 
[T]he 'restoration' of Palestine as the Jewish National Home is a historic necessity, 
not only for the Jews ... but for the relief of the whole world from a problem whose 
wide range is beyond doubt equally important for Jews and Gentiles alike. Hence, 
Zionism becomes a human help to destiny, a man's effort to fulfill God's promise 
and God's design and, as it were, to correct history. 
SALEEBY, supra note 18, at 17 (footnotes omitted). See David Ben Gurion's Address to the 
Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, 1946, D. BEN GuRION, REBIRTH AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL 
190-209 (1959). 
165. The United Nations General Assembly Delegate from Nepal, reportedly explained 
his country's decision to abstain from voting on Resolutions 3236 and 3237, in these terms: 
Every State, including Israel, had a right to live in security .... While Nepal was 
aware of the suffering of the Palestinian people, it felt that "an injustice did not have 
to be redressed by another injustice." 
United Nations General Assembly 2296th Plenary Meeting (XXIX), Press Release GA/5153, 
Take 17, 22 Nov. 1974. 
166. This view has already been expressed by several Soviet authors who have concluded, 
in the words of one: 
[l]t is not possible to deny the international personality to a nation which is fighting 
for its independence and has entered the stage of creating its own state. It should, 
however, be borne in mind ... that the question of the recognition of such a nation 
as a subject of international law arises in practice only after it has acquired some of 
the elements of statehood, formed a certain organ [a national committee etc.] which 
at the outset appears in behalf of the nation, carrying out, of course, the policies of 
the ruling class of that nation. 
Evgeniev, Pravosubiektnost, suverenitet i nevmeshatelstvo v mezhdunarodnom prave, SGP, 
1952/11, at 77, quoted in N1Nc1c, supra note 101, at 251. 
32
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 3, No. 1 [1975], Art. 18
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol3/iss1/18
252 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 3:221 
whose cause the once friendly winds have shifted. 
The case of Palestine illustrates that international law's appar-
ently close relationship to practice is at once its salvation and its 
damnation. International policy in Palestine, as administered by 
the British, vacillated from promises to Jews in response to their 
needs and pressures to assurances for the Arabs according to the 
exigencies of the moment. 167 Although that policy sought a particu-
lar objective (however vaguely articulated), its failure to base that 
objective upon well-accepted legal principles and pursue it accord-
ingly led to clashing expectations and an outcome which was bound 
to be unacceptable to one or all of the parties. 
On the other hand, international practice, by recognizing and 
dealing with "needs" as they arise (e.g., the Jewish "problem"; the 
claims of Palestinian "refugees" today) relieves some of the emo-
tional pressure which otherwise goes to harden positions and in-
crease the possibility of a violent outcome. 
But in allowing international law to function as so much a 
matter of contingencies, the international community may abandon 
or ignore rights which the community itself had previously con-
ferred. (Israel, once, in some respects, a nursling of international 
law, seemed later to become its orphan and the Palestinians, whose 
standing rose so dramatically in the fall of 1974, are still largely at 
the mercy of such influential neighbors as Egypt and Syria.) 
This is part of the irony of the Palestinian conflict. In addition 
to such parallels in the history of the Jewish and Palestinian peoples 
as ancient territorial claims, nationalism, homelessness and great 
power manipulation, there is the fact that they have taken similar 
paths toward the attainment of international standing. 168 And be-
cause the exercise of sovereignty is an element of international 
standing, common recognition that the determined more by prac-
tice than principle, the fate which befalls one people with respect 
to that standing may well befall the other. The survival of both 
peoples thus requires a common recognition that the legal rights and 
processes upon which each is standing are the same. 169 
Robert A . Fisher 
167. SALEEBY, supra note 18, at 42. 
168. Even their publicly-stated objectives have had striking similarity. See note 135 
supra. 
169. Herzl said in 1895: 
. . . It is true that the Jewish State is conceived as a peculiarly modern structure on 
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unspecified territory. But a State is formed, not by pieces of land, but rather by a 
number of men united under sovereign rule. 
The people is the subjective, land the objective foundation of a State, and the 
subjective basis is the more important of the two. 
HERZL, supra note 12, at 137. 
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